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商法强制性规范的类型、性质与边界/蒋建湘

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            商法强制性规范的类型、性质与边界

             蒋建湘 中南大学 教授

  内容提要: 根据强制性的来源与性质,商法强制性规范可以分为自治型、国家确认型和国家介入型三类。国家确认型强制性规范属于私法规范,而国家介入型强制性规范既可以是私法规范,也可以是公法规范。分析商法强制性规范的性质有助于正确评价商法的“私法公法化”问题。为实现商法的效率优先价值,国家确认型强制性规范的边界由商事主体意思自治决定,而国家介入型强制性规范的边界以维护公共利益所必需为限,商事立法和司法应注意商法强制性规范的边界。


在商法从最早的商事习惯到习惯法再到近现代国家立法的演变过程中,商法强制性规范也不断发展,在现代商法中,强制性规范已经成为一种普遍的现象。研究这类规范的产生演变、类型、性质与边界,使之更好地调整商事活动,是商事立法、司法与理论研究的重要课题。

一、商法强制性规范的产生及其类型

在今天的商事立法中,大量存在着商事主体必须遵守的强制性规范。理论界一般从商主体法和商行为法两个角度来考察这种规范:[1]一是商主体法中的强制性规范。主要表现在市场准入规则、商事组织的内部关系规则、外部规则、退出规则。市场主体的准入规则又包括一般规则与特殊规则,前者是法律强制规定商事主体的类型以及各个类型的基本条件、成立程序,特殊规则就是法律对于从事特定交易的主体还有一些特别限制,在我国主要表现为特殊经营许可证制度;商事组织的内部关系规则主要规定商事组织成员之间的关系、组织与组织成员之间的关系、组织与组织的经营管理人之间的关系;外部规则主要规定商主体同债权人的关系,包括有限责任适用规则、无限责任的承担以及发行债券时的一些特殊规则;退出规则主要是规定商主体的消灭事由、程序,如解散、破产与清算规则。二是商行为法中的强制性规范。这些规范主要包括两大类:一是体现了国家对经济活动的一般性管理的强制规范,比如消费者保护、环境保护、产业管理,所有商行为都必须遵守。一是国家制定的对证券、票据、保险、信托、银行业务、海商等特殊商行为进行管理的强制性规范,诸如票据法中的票据种类、票据行为的有效、票据抗辩限制制度、票据行为的要式主义;保险法中的责任准备金、再保险、保险业的监督管理等规定;海商法中的船舶登记、海事赔偿责任限制、船舶抵押权等规定;证券法中的信息披露制度、强制性收购制度,等等。

上述考察方式也是商法强制性规范的一种分类方法,其对于了解商法中的强制性规范现象很有意义。但这种分类对于分析商法强制性规范的产生、演变、性质以及指导相关立法和司法的价值有限,为了进一步分析商法强制性规范的上述问题,本文认为,可以根据强制性的来源与性质对商法强制性规范进行分类,通过这种分类,也可以了解其产生和演变历程。

(一)自治型强制性规范

大多数学者认为,近代商法起源于中世纪地中海沿岸的商业城市和海上贸易,由贸易习惯、惯例逐渐演变成为习惯法,近代商法最初不过是近代国家对习惯法的确认。也就是说,商法最早以习惯法的形式出现。如果从广义上将这种(被纳入国家立法之前的)习惯法理解为商法,那么,商法强制性规范的产生时间就很久远了,显然,为了调整商事活动,习惯法中必定包含有关于商事活动主体义务的强制性内容,即强制性规范。也正因如此,我国有学者认为商法强制性规范并非近现代国家干预的产物,“最初的商人法,并不是国家法,但是已经出现了大量的强制性规范,对于商人行会内部的商人甚至对于商人与非商人之间的纠纷处理而言,它们都具有强制力”。[2]

在习惯法被国家确认之前,其规范的强制性不可能来自国家,只能是一种自治性的强制,并通过这种自治强制使得商事活动得以顺利进行,“中世纪商人们最伟大之处就在于:他们根据自己的意愿创造了自己的法律……这就要求在商事实践活动中要由商人们自己来安排发生在他们内部团体间因为商品交易关系所产生的权利义务关系,并通过商人法院的‘参与仲裁制’及时、自主地处理商事纠纷和争议”。[3]由于习惯法规范的强制性来自于自治,因而可以将这种强制性规范称为自治型强制性规范。

(二)国家确认型强制性规范

习惯法在经历了数个世纪的发展以后,逐渐发展成为被封建政权承认的法律,获得了在法院或者法庭适用的资格,从而使商法的发展进入了一个新的阶段。进入16世纪后,欧洲的商品经济显示出了蓬勃的生机,与此同时,欧洲一些国家的封建割据势力日渐衰落而统一的民族国家逐步形成,这就形成了民族国家制定统一法律和商人习惯法向成文法转变的条件,近代商法得以产生,商法实现了从习惯法向国家立法的转变。[4]显然,在近代国家商事立法中同样存在强制性规范,即商法强制性规范。

近代商事立法——不管是封建政权对习惯法的承认还是资本主义国家的成文立法——只是国家对习惯法的确认。这是因为,对于当时的封建政权,其除了承认习惯法,自身并没有力量介入商事活动,“事实上,由于封建主和教会势力的强大以及对商业的歧视和抵制,封建法和教会法不可能为商人提供法律规则和救济措施,这样,日益壮大起来的商人阶层通过自治运动而创立的法则无法纳入国家法的体系,只能以民间法的样态存在。”[5]而对于当时的资本主义国家,商事活动在资本主义形成后的很长一段时间(19世纪以前的自由资本主义阶段)都一直被认作为纯粹私人之间的事情,国家不予干涉,“政府除了保护财产,没有其他目的”。[6]因此,近代商事立法并不改变原来习惯法中强制性规范的内容,国家并未给商事主体施加新的强制,仅仅是以国家强制替代原来的自治强制,也就是说,除了保证实施的主体不同,这种强制性规范仍然是商事主体按照传统习惯法自行约定的强制性规范。正是在此意义上,这种强制性规范可以称为国家确认型强制性规范。

(三)国家介入型强制性规范

19世纪以来,随着生产社会化和垄断资本主义的到来,商事领域发生了巨大的变化。从竞争秩序来看,组织化程度越来越高的商事主体(如公司)大规模出现,垄断组织得以盛行,商事主体相互之间的竞争地位变得事实上不平等,同时,激烈的竞争使得不正当竞争成为普遍现象,竞争秩序和消费者的利益受到严重的影响。从商事活动本身来看,商事活动已从传统的简单买卖关系发展出了证券、保险、票据交易等商事活动方式,交易日益复杂和多样化,交易范围愈益扩大,并关涉到交易的安全和公众的利益。此外,商事主体本身也越来越复杂,公司制的普遍推行打破了传统的所有权同经营权合一的模式,委托人(股东)同其代理人(公司管理层)之间的矛盾与纠纷出现,有限责任也使得公司相对交易人的安全受到可能的威胁。所有这些现象导致了一系列社会问题的产生,也给商事活动的正常进行造成了严重的影响,客观上要求国家介入商事活动。同时,20世纪凯恩斯主义的兴起也动摇了传统的经济学理论,为国家介入商事活动作了铺垫。于是,商事立法中出现了大量体现国家介入内容的规范,《公司法》、《证券法》、《保险法》、《票据法》、《海商法》、《破产法》等立法中都出现了大量的强制性规范,要求商事主体必须遵照执行。

这种强制性规范设立的目的除了维护个体的利益,更多的是维护公众的利益,它不同于确认型规范,它不是对商事主体自行约定的强制性规范的确认,而是一种国家创制,正是在此意义上,这种规范可以称为国家介入型强制性规范。在当代,这种强制性规范已成为商法中的普遍现象,并同确认型规范相并存。国家介入型强制性规范的产生是历史的必然,正如马克斯·韦伯指出的,“习惯、惯例至今仍影响着契约义务的私人利益和通过对财产的互相保护而实现的共同利益。但是,这些影响随着传统的崩溃而减弱”,“现代商业交往的节奏需要法律制度,即具有强大拘束力保障的制度,具有可确定和可预见作用”。[7]

二、商法强制性规范的性质

商法强制性规范的性质是指其公法或私法属性,这是当前理论界较有争议的一个问题。同时,分析商法强制性规范的性质有助于正确评价商法的“私法公法化”问题。当然,由于商法同民法之间的亲缘关系,在分析商法强制性规范的性质时首先界定其同民法强制性规范的关系也是必要的。

(一)商法强制性规范同民法强制性规范的关系

民法中的强制性规范大量存在,有学者将民法中的强制性规范(即所谓“内设型强制性规范”)分为两类:一是为自治的私法行为设定最低法律要求的强制性规范,如自治行为的主体资格(权利能力和行为能力)、自治行为在法律上如何形成(法律行为的成立要件和生效要件)、自治行为的对象如何在法律上识别(如物权法定和公示公信原则)等等;二是铺设通往其他法律“管道”的强制性规范,如通往民事程序法“管道”的强制性规范(《合同法》变更权、撤销权、债权人的代位权和撤销权),通往民事特别法管道的强制性规范(《物权法》关于“不动产登记”的规定与《不动产登记法》的适用)和通往公法管道的强制性规范,等等。[8]那么,商法强制性规范同民法强制性规范的关系该如何界定呢?

显然,界定这两种规范之间的关系同定位商法与民法之间的关系密不可分,后者是前者的前提。但是,关于民法同商法关系的争议一直存在。有学者认为我国只存在独立的民法部门,而并不存在一个商法部门,各个商事法律不过是民法的特别法,“我国民法作为调整社会市场经济活动的基本法,是千千万万种交易关系的抽象化的法律表现。……调整市场经济关系的商事法规不过是民法原则在具体领域中的体现,是民法规范在某些经济活动中的具体化。民法和商事法规之间是基本法与补充基本法的单行法规之间的关系……确切地说,所谓商事法规也是民事法规”。[9]有学者则力证商法不是民法的特别法,“没有一个现代国家会认为商法是特别法的观点是正确的”,[10]并认为商法“从一开始就与民法毫无关系”。[11]显然,这两种观点都有问题,现在民商法理论界的主流观点是:商事主体之间的商事活动依然属于平等主体之间的财产关系内容,商法的内容和原则要受到民法基本原则的指导和约束,但这也不能成为认为商法为民法特别法和否定商法独立性的理由,商法调整市场经济活动中一个独立的领域,民法虽然也可以对其进行调整,但其重点并不在于此,“民法虽然是主要调整财产(经济)关系,但民法就其产生和演变来说,对人(其中特别是公民)自身的价值、人的法律地位、人的权利的关注远胜于对财产的关注。这也是民法区别于商法的表现之一。因此,对民法来说,只有人本身才是目的,而财产仅仅是实现人的目的的手段。如果本末倒置,把规范财产关系作为民法的主要着眼点和核心内容,而不注重对人类理性的提升和确认,那么因此而制定出的民法典只能是对民法本质的歪曲和异化。”[12]

基于此,对商法强制性规范同民法强制性规范的关系易于界定。尽管民法可以统摄商法,从而民法强制性规范可以涵盖商法强制性规范,但由于商法的独立性,商法强制性规范调整的对象不同于民法强制性规范,后者不专门涉及商事活动领域,本文讨论的商法强制性规范也仅指专门调整商事活动的强制性规范。

(二)不同类型的商法强制性规范具有不同的性质

国内不少学者将商法强制性规范笼统地称为“公法化的私法规范”。这种称谓并无不妥,但就认识其性质来说则会导致疑问,即,“公法化的私法规范”到底是公法规范,私法规范,还是介于公、私法之间的“第三类规范”?公法和私法的划分始于罗马法学家乌尔披亚努斯,他的划分标准是:规定国家公务的为公法,如有关政府的组织、公共财产的管理、宗教的祭仪和官吏选人等法规;规定个人利益的为私法,如调整家庭、婚姻、物权、债权、债务和继承关系等的法规。公法规范是强制性的,当事人必须无条件地遵守,“公法的规范不得由个人之间的协议而变更”;而私法规范则是任意性的,可以由当事人的意志而更改,它的原则是“对当事人来说‘协议就是法律’。”[13]尽管现在大陆法系国家的公、私法划分标准同罗马法的有所差异,[14]但本质上没有发生改变,现在公法类法律仍然是指涉及公共利益的法律,私法类法律主要涉及私人利益。[15]一种法律规范可以以纯粹公法规范、纯粹私法规范或者既有公法内容又有私法内容的规范的形式存在,但在第三种情况下,理论上仍然可以对其进行拆分,进一步区分出公法规范和私法规范,正如日本学者美浓部达吉指出的:“公法和私法在相互接触的区域间极为近似,欲截然区分为二,殊非易事,但是,这和在自然科学的领域中,动物和植物于其相近的境界内,彼此的区别也不常明了一样,不能成为否定二者区别的理由。”[16]因此,严格意义上规范只以两种形式存在,公法规范或者私法规范,同样,商法强制性规范要么属于公法规范,要么属于私法规范。

首先,国家确认型强制性规范属于私法规范。前文已分析,国家确认型强制性规范是在商法从传统习惯法到近代国家商事立法过程中产生的,这种强制性规范仍然是商事主体按照传统习惯法自行约定的强制性规范,国家不过是对其予以承认或立法确认。因此,国家的作用仅仅是保证传统商事习惯法中的强制性规范能以国家强制力保障实施。换句话说,国家并没有介入商事活动,国家强制也未改变这种强制性规范自治强制的性质。基于此,我们可以认定这种国家确认型强制性商法规范仍然属于私法规范。这种私法属性的强制性规范虽然产生于近代商法,但一直被延续下来,在现代商法中也随处可见,如有关违约责任、合同解除等内容的一些(当然并非所有)规范。当然,从其产生根源来看,这种规范还可以追溯到最古老的商事习惯和习惯法,它们产生于商事主体之间的约定和习惯,是意思自治的产物。
Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU


OUTLINE


I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy





I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:

“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”

This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.

II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement(to be discussed in subsequent chapter).6

III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11
建立违宪审查制度刻不容缓

李步云


  依法治国,建设社会主义法治国家,作为我国的一项治国方略和奋斗目标,已被庄严地载入宪法。宪法是国家的根本大法,是全国各族人民、一切国家机关和武装力量、各政党和各社会团体、各企事业组织的根本活动准则。依法治国的根本是依宪法治国;依法办事首先应当依宪办事。不重视宪法的作用,就会丢失立国的根本;不树立宪法的权威,就难以树立法律的权威。

  自现行宪法制定以来,广大干部和群众的宪法意识已经有了提高。但是必须看到,我国宪法的实施不能说没有问题了。新中国成立已50多年,还从来没有处理过违宪案件。我们既没有设置具体负责受理与审查违宪案件的专门机构,没有制定具体的违宪审查的特别程序,也没有设计出一套进行违宪审查的理论和原则。例如,在我国什么叫违宪?它有哪些构成要件?违宪的主体可以是哪些机关和个人?违宪的客体应是什么样的行为?违宪行为有无时效?什么样的组织和个人可以提出进行违宪审查的要求或控告?违宪审查机构是“不告不理”还是可以主动审查?它以什么形式进行裁决,其效力又如何?等等,在我国理论界和权力机构中,都还没有明确和统一的认识。

  世界各国违宪审查机构的设置,大体上可以分为四大类:一是由立法机构负责违宪审查。通常认为英国和前苏联是采用这种方式的代表。英国实行“议会至上”的宪政体制,内阁和法院由议会产生并对其负责,议会可以制定、修改和废止任何法律,包括各种宪法性文件;任何一部法律如果违宪,也只能通过议会才能修正或废止。由于英国采用这种体制有其历史的特殊性,而这种体制有一重要缺点,即“自己监督自己”,因此西方国家效仿它的极少。

  二是由司法机关负责违宪审查。首创这种体制的是美国。它建立在“三权分立”的政治哲学基础上,它的直接渊源是著名的马伯里诉麦迪逊案这一判例。现在全世界效仿美国模式的有60多个国家。但是大多数国家还是依据本国的具体国情作出某些规定。例如,只有最高法院才能审查违宪的立法,法庭组成人员要吸收法学教授、政治家参加,审查程序也不同于一般的法院审案程序。

  三是由专门的政治机关负责违宪审查。法国是实行这种体制的典型。法国现行宪法规定:“宪法委员会的成员为九人,任期九年,不得连任。宪法委员会成员每三年更新三分之一,其中三名由共和国总统任命,三名由国民议会议长任命,三名由参议会议长任命。除上述规定的九名成员外,各前任共和国总统是宪法委员会当然的终身成员。”其主要职责是“宪法委员会监督共和国选举”,“各组织法在公布前,议会两院的规章在施行前,都必须提交宪法委员会,宪法委员会应就其是否符合宪法作出裁决”。为了同样的目的,各个法律在公布前,可以由共和国总统、总理、国民议会议长、参议院议长、六十名国民议会议员或六十名参议院议员提交宪法委员会。此外,该委员会还有权裁决议会两院议员选举中的法律争议以及监督全民公决等等。该委员会活动是秘密的,开会只公布结果,不公布理由和讨论内容。法国宪法委员会具有很强的政治性和很高的权威性,各国完全效仿的不多,但很重视它的某些长处和经验。

  四是由宪法法院负责违宪审查。这种模式由奥地利于1920年首创,后来很多国家相继效仿。奥地利的宪法法院由12名正式成员和6名替补成员组成。院长、副院长及6名正式成员和3名替补成员,由联邦政府提名:国民议院和联邦议院各提出3名正式成员,1名替补成员。以上名单均由总统任命。所有宪法法院的成员和替补成员均需有法学或政治学学历,并且担任法学或政治学专业职务不少于10年。奥地利宪法还规定:“任何政党的雇员或其他工作人员均不得被任命为宪法法院成员。”宪法法院职权通常包括:解释宪法;裁决国家机关之间的权限争议;审查各种法律、法规、法令的合宪性;审理或监督审理高级官员包括总统的弹劾案;审查公民个人提起的宪法诉讼等等。

  世界各国违宪审查制度对树立宪法的权威和维护国家法制的统一,对保障民主、法治与人权,对维护国家政治与社会的稳定,都起了重要的作用,其具体经验我们也可以借鉴。但是,在我国建立违宪审查制度,必须从我国的具体国情出发。人民代表大会制度是我国的根本政治制度,立足于我国的政治体制来建立违宪审查制度是首先必须坚持的。民主与法治的健全与完善是一个长期的发展过程,不能想当然去追求那些所谓的“理想”模式。

  基于以上考虑,我们建议:全国人民代表大会设立宪法监督委员会。它受全国人民代表大会领导;在人民代表大会闭会期间,受全国人民代表大会常务委员会领导。宪法监督委员会由主任委员、副主任委员两人和委员二十至十五人组成,其主任、副主任人选由大会主席团在副委员长中提名,委员人选在代表中提名,大会通过。宪法监督委员会的组成人员中,应当有适当数量的法学专家。在大会闭会期间,全国人民代表大会常务委员会可以补充任命缺额的副主任或委员。宪法监督委员会可以聘请若干法学专家担任顾问,顾问由全国人大常委会任免。顾问列席会议,但无表决权。宪法监督委员会的职责如下:(一)对宪法解释,提出意见和建议;(二)对现行法律,行政法规和地方性法规,自治条例和单行条例是否同宪法相抵触,提出审查意见;(三)对报送全国人民代表大会常务委员会备案的地方性法规是否同宪法和法律相抵触,提出审查意见;(四)对报送全国人民代表大会常务委员会批准的自治区的自治条例和单行条例是否同宪法和法律相抵触,提出审查意见;(五)对全国人民代表大会及其常务委员会授权国务院制定的行政法院,或者授权省级人民代表大会及其常务委员会制定的地方性法规是否同宪法和法律相抵触,提出审查意见;(六)对国务院裁决的省级地方性法规同行政法规相抵触,省级地方性法规同国务院部门规章之间有矛盾的处理意见,提出审查意见;(七)对中央一级国家机关之间的权限争议,提出处理意见;(八)对中央一级国家机关的重大政策和决策是否违宪,提出审查意见;(九)对全国人民代表大会选举的中央一级国家机关领导人员的罢免案,提出审查意见;(十)全国人民代表大会及其常务委员会交付的其他工作。以上机构的设置及其职权的设定,同我国现行宪法的原则精神和具体规定是完全一致的。

  目前,我国在制宪、行宪方面已积累了相当多的经验。广大干部和群众的法制观念和宪法意识已有很大提高。政治体制改革和民主政治建设已取得长足的进展。为了预防和消除权力腐败和权力异化,民主监督体系正在加强。我国已经加入世界贸易组织,社会主义市场经济将进一步完善。党的执政地位空前巩固。所有这一切,都为今天在我国建立违宪审查制度,提出了迫切要求和提供了现实条件。如果本届人大能在自己的任期内建立起违宪审查制度,将为党的十六大和新一届人大,为新世纪的民主法治建设献上一份厚礼。